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On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme

Davidson attacks the intelligibility of conceptual relativism, i.e. of truth relative to a conceptual scheme. He defines the notion of a conceptual scheme as something ordering, organizing, and rendering intelligible empirical content, and calls the position that employs both notions scheme‐content dualism. He argues that such dualism (the ‘third, and perhaps, last dogma of empiricism’) is untenable since: (1) not only can we not parcel out empirical content sentence per sentence (as Quine's rejection of the analytic‐synthetic distinction had shown) but also (2) the notion of uninterpreted content to which several schemes are relative, and the related notion of a theory ‘fitting the evidence’, can be shown to lack intelligibility too. Davidson argues further that belief in incommensurable schemes or non‐intertranslatable languages is possible only on violating a correct understanding of interpretability (developed in Essays 9 and 10): if we succeed in interpreting someone else then we have shown there is no need to speak of two conceptual schemes, while if we fail ‘there is no ground for speaking of two.’

参考

ディヴィッドソン「好意は、実際的(コミュニケーションの)理論を手にする為の条件(略)コミュニケーションを望むなら、好むと好まざるとに関わらず、大抵の事柄で彼らは正しい(彼ら自身が信ずべき行動をしている)と考えなければならない」

（「On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme」)

「特権アクセス」といって、我々の内面は我々それぞれ個人個人にしか分からないので(嘘発見器や自白剤を使っても内面を知ることは困難)、本当なら知りえない内面を知りえることができるというのが物語の面白さでありますね。我々は生まれてから亡くなるまで、自分にしか特権アクセスできないので。

現代の言語哲学や認識論が既に独我論とかを論破しているのは凄く面白いね。