e-voting
Proposals
EuroS&P '20
Ralf K¨usters (University of Stuttgart)
Tassos Dimtiriou
Computer Networks, 2020.6
Yuxian Zhang, Yi Li, Li Fang, Ping Chen, Xinghua Dong
ICCC'19
Thomas Haines and Rajeev Gore and Bhavesh Sharma
S&P'21
Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting
SoK/Analysis of existing systems
Atte Juvonen (UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI), 2019.10
Sunoo Park, Michael Specter, Neha Narula, Ronald L. Rivest (MIT)
Define five minimal requirements for secure elections
(1) ballot secrecy; (2) software independence; (3) voter-verifiable ballots; (4) contestability; and (5) auditing.
Estonian i-voting system
i-voting
Drew Springall† Travis Finkenauer† Zakir Durumeric† Jason Kitcat‡ Harri Hursti Margaret MacAlpine J. Alex Halderman
CCS'14
University of Oxford
Voatz
Used
in the 2018 midterm elections of West Virginia (and then abandoned)
Michael A. Specter, James Koppel, and Daniel Weitzner (MIT)
in the 2018 midterm elections of West Virginia (and then abandoned)
Voatz has been used in federal, state, and municipal elections in West Virginia, Denver, Oregon, and Utah, as well as the 2016 Massachusetts Democratic Convention and the 2016 Utah Republican Convention
The National Cybersecurity Center
Moscow
September 2019 city council elections
Sfirnaciuc Emilia and Vasilescu Miruna-Elena and Simion Emil
Electronic voting
Susan Bell, Office of the Travis County Clerk; Josh Benaloh, Microsoft Research; Michael D. Byrne, Rice University, ...
collaboration between a number of academics and the Travis County (Austin), Texas elections office
Optical scan voting system
David Chaum, et al.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 2009
OmniBallot
Michael A. Specter
Usenix Security'21