Payment/State Channel
SoK
SoK: Off The Chain Transactions
Lewis Gudgeon (Imperial College London) Patrick McCorry (King’s College London) Pedro Moreno-Sanchez (TU Wien) Arthur Gervais (Imperial College London, Liquidity Network, Lucerne University)
FC'20
Related Slide by Partick
SoK: A Taxonomy for Layer-2 Scalability Related Protocols for Cryptocurrencies
Maxim Jourenko, Mario Larangeira, Kanta Kurazumi, Keisuke Tanaka (Tokyo Institute of Technology.)
Proposals
BRICK: Asynchronous State Channels
Georgia Avarikioti (ETH Zürich) Eleftherios Kokoris Kogias (EPFL) Roger Wattenhofer (ETH Zürich)
Sprites and State Channels: Payment Networks that Go Faster than Lightning
Andrew Miller, Iddo Bentov, Ranjit Kumaresan, Christopher Cordi, Patrick McCorry
Pisa: Arbitration Outsourcing for State Channels
Patrick McCorry, Surya Bakshi, Iddo Bentov, Sarah Meiklejohn, Andrew Miller
Slide @ScalingBitcoin'19
Generalized
Perun
Counterfactual (L4)
Celer
Hydra: Fast Isomorphic State Channels
Manuel M. T. Chakravarty, Sandro Coretti, Matthias Fitzi, Peter Gaˇzi, Philipp Kant, Aggelos Kiayias, and Alexander Russell
Attacks
Hijacking Routes in Payment Channel Networks: A Predictability Tradeoff
Saar Tochner, Aviv Zohar, Stefan Schmid
Congestion Attacks in Payment Channel Networks
Ayelet Mizrahi, Aviv Zohar (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Medium
Analysis
A Cryptoeconomic Traffic Analysis of Bitcoin’s Lightning Network
Institute for Computer Science and Control (SZTAKI), Hungary
Privacy
Onion routing
slide
Bolt: Anonymous Payment Channels for Decentralized Currencies
Matthew Green Ian Miers
Blind Off-chain Lightweight Transactions (≠ "BOLT": Lightning RFC )
no need for zero-knowledge proof
ZCash blog
any real privacy provided by BOLT fundamentally depends on channel establishment and closure being anonymous
Better privacy with SNARKs @lightning-dev mailing list
Concurrency and Privacy with Payment-Channel Networks
Giulio Malavolta, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Aniket Kate, Matteo Maffei, Srivatsan Ravi
the foundations for privacy and concurrency in PCNs, presenting a formal definition in the Universal Composability framework as well as practical and provably secure solutions
ZKboo
formally define the Multi-Hop HTLC contract and provide an efficient instantiation based on ZK-Boo
improves on previous proposals Better privacy with SNARKs reducing
the data required from 650 MB to 17 MB,
the running time for the prover from 600 ms to 309 ms
the running time for verifying from 500 ms to 130 ms
Multi-Hop HTLC does not require changes to the current Bitcoin scripting system
A^2L: Anonymous Atomic Locks for Scalability and Interoperability in Payment Channel Hubs
Erkan Tairi, Pedro Moreno-Sanchez, Matteo Maffei (TU Wien)
Slide @Scailing'19
Z-Channel: Scalable and Efficient Scheme in Zerocash
a micropayment system in Zerocash called Z-Channel
improve Zerocash to support multisignature and time lock functionalities
prove that the reconstructed scheme is secure
Toward Active and Passive Confidentiality Attacks On Cryptocurrency Off-Chain Networks
Utz Nisslmueller, Klaus-Tycho Foerster, Stefan Schmid (University of Vienna), Christian Decker (Blockstream)
Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks for Blockchain Scalability and Interoperability
Giulio Malavolta (Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nürnberg), Pedro Moreno Sanchez (TU Wien), Clara Schneidewind (TU Wien), Aniket Kate (Purdue University), Matteo Maffei (TU Wien)
NDSS'20
Anonymous Multi-Hop Locks based on scriptless Scripts, not HTLC
Applicable for inter-chain payment channel
UC proof
Others
LN coins have position-dependent value
The Difficulties in Designing Protocols: UTXO + Script vs Expressive Contracts
Replace by revocation vs Replace by version Tweet
Channels are Byzantine Fault Safe SMR on BFT SMR
Also see
State channel: UC Model
State Channel (Japanese)
#state_channel #Layer_2