Cryptoeconomics
See also
Economics in various applications
Verifier's of for Fraud detection
Julia Koch, Christian Reitwießner
Vote buying
Collateral
Dominik Harz et al.
CCS'19
Follow-up: Trusty @ethresear.ch Stable coins
Ariah Klages-Mundt, Andreea Minca (Cornell)
CVC'19
Amani Moin, Kevin Sekniqi, and Emin G ̈un Sirer (Cornell University and AVA Labs)
FC'20
Ariah Klages-Mundt, Dominik Harz, Lewis Gudgeon, Jun-You Liu, Andreea Minca
DEX
Guillermo Angeris, Hsien-Tang Kao, Rei Chiang, Charlie Noyes, Tarun Chitra
Uniswap arbitrage problem is convex, implying that the arbitrage conditions are often easy to compute and are extremely likely to hold in practice.
There doesn’t seem to be a way of depleting Uniswap markets of their reserves by only trading the pair of coins found in the market.
The larger the fees, the larger the no-arbitrage bounds are, which means that the Uniswap price may stray further from the true market price.
Gives an explicit formula for Uniswap returns in the no-fee case by constructing an equivalent portfolio
P2P Transaction propagation
by Phil Daian
Oguzhan Ersoy, Zekeriya Erkin and Reginald L. Lagendijk (Delft University of Technology)
EuroS&PW'19
Moduler component for incentive-compatible transaction advertisement
Tutorials
Introduction to Cryptoeconomics Video by Vitalik Blockchain and Smart Contract Mechanism Design Challenges Slide by Vitalik Programmable Incentives - Intro to Cryptoeconomics Video by Karl Floresch @DEVCON3 A Crash Course in Mechanism Design for Cryptoeconomic Applications article The current state of Cryptoeconomics Video by Vlad 2017 Vlad's function$ S \rightarrow \Sigma \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^n Tweet Incentive analysis on non-blockchain distributed algorism
SOSP'05
Amitanand S. Aiyer, et al. (University of Texas at Austin)
Assumption on rational nodes
Rational nodes receive a long term benefit from participating in the protocol
Rational nodes are conservative when computing the impact of Byzantine nodes on their utility.
If a protocol provides a Nash equilibrium, then all rational nodes will follow it.
BAR-B: The first cooperative backup service to tolerate both Byzantine users and an unbounded number of rational users.
Based on is an asynchronous replicated state machine
Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev Joseph Y. Halpern Rica Gonen
Ittai Abraham, Lorenzo Alvisi Joseph Y. Halpern
Discuss the above paper and BAR paper
Ittai Abraham, Danny Dolev Joseph Y. Halpern
Byzantine Agreement and Game Theory