CBDC: SoK
WIP
Overviews
Morten Bech (BIS), Rodney Garratt (USCB)
The money flower: a taxonomy of money
Retail (literature on anonymity needs, Sweden's case) & Whole sale (e.g., Jasper-Ubin)
Orla Ward, Sabrina Rochemont (Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, UK)
CBDC's context and concepts, blockchain technology, attitudes of central banks
Tobias Adrian, Martin Muhleisen, and Maurice Obstfeld (IMF)
Basics, frameworks, roles of CBDCs for central banks, summary of experiments
Blog @WSJ
Neha Narula (MIT Media Lab, DCI), Lawrence H. White (George Mason University)
For and against CBDC.
Raphael Auer and Rainer Boehme
The CBDC pyramid, list of ongoing retail CBDC projects
World Economic Forum, Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution
Compiled by Ashley Lannquist
Last updated: Feb 24, 2021
Wholesale
CPMI
Potential innovations of wholesale digital tokens
New settlement platforms (DvP of securities, PvP of foreign exchange transactions)
Access to an alternative settlement asset (for e.g. non-banks)
Efficiency (reduced settlement cycles, longer availability, standardization, richer data and transparency)
List of key questions on the design of wholesale digital tokens
Macro economics
Banks' perspectives
CES'20
Jeremy Ney (MIT Media Lab, DCI), Nicolas Xuan-Yi Zhang (MIT)
Focus on bank disintermediation in tranquil financial times, not the run risk in times of systemic financial distress.
This classification is based on Casting Light on Central Bank Digital Currency (IMF, 2018)
CBDC as risk-free store of value, without the subsequent market distortions that FDIC deposit insurance causes
Effects on business models / risk practices
Case study: U.S. student loan market and the New Zealand agribusiness
Social welfare
Itai Agur, Anil Ari and Giovanni Dell’Ariccia
Mathematical analysis of the optimal CBDC design for social welfare
Trade-off between cash-like anonymity and security, interest-bearing or not.
Utility maximization problem among households, banks, firms, and the central bank
https://gyazo.com/9430f3741b8d763edff47b89d88b8763
Tech
George Danezis, Sarah Meiklejohn (University College London)
Propose RSCoin
Central banks control the monetary supply, but rely on a distributed set of authorities (mintettes)
Consists of shards (assumption: honest majority of each shard), two-phase commit
Benefits
Non-repudiation: Mintettes provide receipt upon committing transaction
Auditability (mintettes can’t cheat without detection)
Robleh Ali and Neha Narula (MIT Media Lab, DCI)
Constituent parts: consensus protocol, programmable Money (e.g atomic swap), Privacy-preserving auditing
Matthieu Bouchaud, Tom Lyons, Matthieu Saint Olive, Ken Timsit (ConsenSys)
Propose intermediary-based CBDC on permissioned Ethereum
Intermediaries act as (consensus) nodes and have accounts on-chain
State channels between intermediaries
Intermediaries operate its own side chain that stores users' balances