Algorand

Resources

Jing Chen (Stony Brook University), Silvio Micali (MIT)

Ephemeral keys to prevent posterior corruption

Abount network asumption,

For most part of this paper we assume that every propagated message reaches almost all honest users in a timely fashion. We shall remove this assumption in Section 10

Yossi Gilad, Rotem Hemo, Silvio Micali, Georgios Vlachos, Nickolai Zeldovich (MIT)

SOSP'17

Economics

Protocol

Probabilistic finality

Network assumption and claims

Gossip network

See Section 3 of the first paper and Section 2.7 / 10 of the second paper

Most honest users (e.g., 95%) can send messages that will be received by most other honest users (e.g., 95%) within a known time bound

Allows the adversary to control the network of a few honest users

The network can be asynchronous (i.e., entirely controlled by the adversary) for a long but bounded period of time (e.g., at most 1 day or 1 week).

After an asynchrony period, the network must be strongly synchronous for a reasonably long period again (e.g., a few hours or a day)

No incentive discussion (no reward, no punishment)

Algorand is secure under adaptive adversary models but not bribing attacker models because of how it relies on private information for random selection.

Vault

Adam Suhl, Yossi Gilad, and Nickolai Zeldovich (MIT)

Vault: a cryptocurrency that reduces storage and bootstrapping costs significantly

Decoupling of account balances from doublespending detection

Adaptive sharding scheme

Potential flaws

Mauro Conti, et al.

Security flaw on the message validation process which leads to DDoS attacks

Yongge Wang (UNC Charlotte)