List of papers
Jing Chen (Stony Brook University), Silvio Micali (MIT)
Ephemeral keys to prevent posterior corruption
Abount network asumption,
For most part of this paper we assume that every propagated message reaches almost all honest users in a timely fashion. We shall remove this assumption in Section 10
Algorand: Scaling Byzantine Agreements for Cryptocurrencies
Yossi Gilad, Rotem Hemo, Silvio Micali, Georgios Vlachos, Nickolai Zeldovich (MIT)
by Andrew Huang
by Preet Patel and Umang Lathia
On Incentive Compatible Role-based Reward Distribution in Algorand
Network assumption and claims
See Section 3 of the first paper and Section 2.7 / 10 of the second paper
Most honest users (e.g., 95%) can send messages that will be received by most other honest users (e.g., 95%) within a known time bound
Allows the adversary to control the network of a few honest users
The network can be asynchronous (i.e., entirely controlled by the adversary) for a long but bounded period of time (e.g., at most 1 day or 1 week).
After an asynchrony period, the network must be strongly synchronous for a reasonably long period again (e.g., a few hours or a day)
No incentive discussion (no reward, no punishment)
The Need for an Incentive Scheme in Algorand
Algorand is secure under adaptive adversary models but not bribing attacker models because of how it relies on private information for random selection.
No deposit (
pure proof of stake
PPoS vs. Bonded Proof-of-Stake
Vault: Fast Bootstrapping for the Algorand Cryptocurrency
Adam Suhl, Yossi Gilad, and Nickolai Zeldovich (MIT)
Vault: a cryptocurrency that reduces storage and bootstrapping costs significantly
Decoupling of account balances from doublespending detection
Adaptive sharding scheme
Blockchain Trilemma Solver Algorand has Dilemma over Undecidable Messages (2019)
Mauro Conti, et al.
Security flaw on the message validation process which leads to DDoS attacks
Algorand, may be, somewhat broken.
Another Look at ALGORAND
Yongge Wang (UNC Charlotte)