E. Nelson, ๐”ผ๐•ƒ๐”ผ๐•„๐”ผโ„•๐•‹๐•Š
#่ซ–ๆ–‡
#Edward_Nelson
https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.00369
The Hilbert-Ackermann consistency theorem implies that there is no proof of a contradiction, even with quantifiers, in $ @\mathsf{Q}. This theorem can be only partially established in $ \mathsf{Q}^*. The crucial new insight is that it can be proved provided there are bounds on features of the proof (called rank and level) but emphatically not depending on the length of the proof. These bounds on rank and level cannot be proved in $ \mathsf{Q}^*, but for each specific proof, $ \mathsf{P}๏ผˆPeano็ฎ—่ก“๏ผ‰ proves that $ \mathsf{Q}^* proves them! This opens the way to exploit the stunning proof without self-reference of Gรถdelโ€™s second incompleteness theorem by Kritchman and Raz (Notices of the American Mathematical Society, December 2011). The upshot is that $ \mathsf{P} proves that $ \mathsf{Q} is inconsistent. But, as is well known, $ \mathsf{P} also proves that $ \mathsf{Q} is consistent. Therefore Peano Arithmetic $ \mathsf{P} is inconsistent.
Hilbert-Ackermannใฎๅฎš็†
Shira Kritchman, Ran Raz, The Surprise Examination Paradox and the Second Incompleteness Theorem