Plasma Contract Fast Finality (Plasma CFF)

The essense of the existing Plasma Fast Finality (Plasma FF) was

The fraudster is always the operator

Collateral is mitigating the motivation to do fraud

So, I extended that idea to other contracts (e.g. Escrow)

The EscrowTx is token locking transaction. So the locking contract cannot be compensated when the Tx has been failed.

Escrow's LockTx is to be initiater of a service. (e.g. AirbnbHost: "Okay, you've locked $100 for me, and so I will tell you the location of the key. When the referee(AirBnB) judges I provided enough value to you, the fund will come to me.")

So, the rollback/failure of lockTx means "no bond but service provided" circumstance.

This is similar to double spend. And yes, fraudster is only the operator (or colluded group of the operator)

Under the Same Territory Assumption, this incident will be solved on court.

And accusation is bad for corporation a.k.a. the operator, hence even with a collateral pool prepared, it is difficult to determine how much amount of compensation is deserved for a 0-conf smart contract Tx. This is because UTXO contracts are dependent upon its context. EscrowTx (lockTx) of Uber, or the one for UberEats, AirBnB, ebay has totally different compensation amount time by time.

By pressing the determination against court, we can use 0-conf smart contract Tx on Plasma. In this context, coercion of litigability works better than collateral loss on the fraudulent actions.

Imagine, what is the loss of canceled 0-conf ubereats initiation Tx? The agent already is going to shop to buy meal due to complete mission and unlock the escrow fund, but haven't bought it. Who must be compensated at how much amount of money? => This is, let's say, loss determination problem.

Now, let's solve it without court, as example. $200 collateral here is. compensation for the agent by $200? Too much. $10 for the agent why the $10 is approximate? This must be decide on smart contract.

Let's say if there are 5 judges and they talk each other to decide how much should the operator pay for the agent. And what if the agent and judges colluded to exploit $200? At this time judges must be litigated to real court.

This kinda hueristic management is required for 0-conf smart contract.

And the dispute above mustn't happen basically. Off chain reconciliation between the operator and the agent is cheapest resolution. On-chain judges are bit fee consuming process but still okay. Real litigation is not cost efficient.