ジェリー・フォーダー、アーネスト・ルポア「ブランダムは包囲された」
Speaking just for ourselves, we’re inclined towards a relatively pragmatic view of explanation; what explanation we should `start with’ depends, inter alia, on what it’s an explanation of and whom it’s an explanation for. But, in any case, we would have thought that explanatory priority is of more than heuristic interest only if it reflects a priority of some other kind: ontological, semantical, psychological or whatever.
ここでの、ontological priorityがブランダム自身が言う所のreference-dependence、psychological priority が sense-dependence に当たるだろうか?
「単称名辞とは個体を指示するものである」と定義したくない理由としては、そのように定義するとフレーゲの「数詞は単称名辞だから数は個体である」という論法が論点先取になってしまうという理由がある (飯田隆『言語哲学大全 I (旧版) 論理と言語』) が、フレーゲのような議論をしたいと思わないなら別に問題がないなあと思った。 "OK, fair enough; it's never really so that one size fits all. On the other hand, I do think that there are a couple of theses that major US and UK philosophers have more or less agreed about (mostly implicitly, to be sure) over the last fifty years or so, and that have largely shaped the landscape of philosophical discussions. Since I think both theses are wrong, I feel strongly about getting them out in the open where they can be jumped up and down on.
"The first is semantic pragmatism: the idea that intensional content is to be explicated as some sort of ｀know how' , hence in epistemic terms. The typical avatar of this view is the thesis that concept possession is something like knowing how to evaluate inferences whose validity turns on the concept, and/or knowing how to sort things that the concept applies to. Peacocke is perhaps the current paradigm, but it's hard to think of anyone since Wittgenstein (indeed, since Dewey) who doesn't hold it. In my view, it's entirely misguided. To have the concept C is to be able to think about Cs as such. Confusing epistemology with semantics has damned near ruined the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language for as long as I can remember. (I have gone on about this in an article called `Having concepts, a brief refutation of the 20th Century,' in a recent issue of MIND AND LANGUAGE. I expect I'll still be going on about it for the foreseeable future.
…
"Who among the living counts as an analytic philosopher by these jaundiced criteria? Not me, for sure. But practically everybody in Australia; Peacocke (see above), McDowell, Brandom, Travis (when he isn't being simply a nihilist), everybody in cognitive science without exception. And so forth. You needn't aim; just pull the trigger and you'll hit one.
フォーダーは分析哲学の要件として意味論的プラグマティズムがあるとしている。
これは単に定義の違いかもしれない。(「分析哲学」という言葉を現在分析哲学者と呼ばれている人のマジョリティを含まない意味で定義するのは変だけど。現代のマジョリティはポスト分析哲学って考えればいい(?))