As Nick Szabo has observed, the most interesting, detailed and elegant European forms are found in the period we call feudal, and thus it is only natural that a reactionary design for future government will have a somewhat feudal feel.
I only claim that this ［feudal］ order approached a natural order through (a) the supremacy of and the subordination of everyone under one law, (b) the absence of any law-making power, and (c) the lack of any legal monopoly of judgeship and conflict arbitration. And I would claim that this system could have been perfected and retained virtually unchanged through the inclusion of serfs into the system. https://mises.org/library/hoppe-democracy-progress-and-state
Dubai isn't homogeneous at all. It still seems to work, pretty much. Homogeneity certainly makes it easier to build a working society, and I think I agree with you that it is essential for anything like a democracy. But that's one of the reasons I don't like democracy. Posted by: Mencius on April 23, 2007 7:33 PM http://www.2blowhards.com/archives/2007/04/_trial_version.html (強調は引用者)
Legal realism succeeded so completely that its acolytes succeeded to actual responsibility, thus invoking Conquest’s law—everyone is reactionary on the subjects he understands. It therefore had to be succeeded in the ’60s and thereafter by critical legal studies and the even more aggro critical race theory, for which even the Wikipedia page is wreathed in pure Stalinist spittle. Do read these pages, if you can stomach looking that long into the eye of the Ring.
(Libertarians: note that at present, your risk of having your human rights violated by a private actor is much greater than your risk of having your human rights violated by a state actor. Which hurts more? A cop hitting you over the head with a club, or a mugger hitting you over the head with a club? In my mind, they hurt about the same. Thus, as a libertarian, my most serious complaint against the State is not any alleged abuses of the security forces, but its tolerance of widespread anarchy and disorder—by several orders of magnitude.)
But some of my smarter readers may notice that “your power can only be removed by killing you” does not actually make you more secure. It just makes security a lot more important than if insecurity meant you’d be voted out and forced to retire to your country villa.
But why would a CEO or other corporate governor create such〔引用者注：長期的な視点を持った〕 a structure? Well, although Reactionaries mock elected politicians for having a four-year time horizon, the average CEO stays only 6.8 years. That’s less than a two-term president. And their own incentives are often also based on bonuses linked to short-term profitability.
In all these relationships, the structure of obligation is the same. The subject, serf, or slave is obliged to obey the government, lord, or master, and work for the benefit of same. In return, the government, lord or master must care for and guide the subject, serf, or slave. We see these same relationship parameters emerging whether the relationship of domination originates as a hereditary obligation, or as a voluntary obligation, or in a state outside law such as the state of the newly captured prisoner (the traditional origin of slave status in most eras). This is a pretty good clue that this structure is one to which humans are biologically adapted.
Not all humans are born the same, of course, and the innate character and intelligence of some is more suited to mastery than slavery. For others, it is more suited to slavery. And others still are badly suited to either. These characteristics can be expected to group differently in human populations of different origins. Thus, Spaniards and Englishmen in the Americas in the 17th and earlier centuries, whose sense of political correctness was negligible, found that Africans tended to make good slaves and Indians did not. This broad pattern of observation is most parsimoniously explained by genetic differences.
Slave labor is actually an excellent example of the Fnargl principle. If you assume security is not a problem, serfdom is always more profitable than slavery and taxation is always more profitable than serfdom.
The profit of slavery is equal to the difference between the price of slave labor and the price of free labor. This vig or rake-off can be replaced with an income tax without changing the economics of the game at all. And once this is done, why shouldn't the slave - now a serf - be able to change jobs? The more he makes, the more you make. -- "対称的主権の魔法"
1. This paragraph has proven to be one of the most controversial in the Moldbug corpus. Some feign outrage at the notion that “Africans tended to make good slaves,” intentionally misreading this as an endorsement of the idea, while also stripping it of critical historical context. But the observation that 17th-century Spaniards and Englishmen found Africans to be better slaves than Indians is hardly controversial—how else to explain the transatlantic slave trade?
Meanwhile, there are those who fret about the suggestion that genetic differences between different populations might account for some of their differences in behavior. Such people would do well to educate themselves on the actual research on the subject, as well as to consult their local dictionary regarding the word parsimonious. Genetic differences aren’t the only explanation for the source of the observed disparity—just the simplest (most parsimonious) one.
Indeed, there is no question that genetic differences made Africans better slaves than indigenous Americans in at least one respect: due to superior genetic resistance, Africans were much less likely to die of tropical diseases like yellow fever and malaria. Those who can’t admit that a live person makes a better slave than a dead one are well beyond the reach of reason. (https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2009/07/why-carlyle-matters/#cha-0_footnote-1, 脚注1より)
TGGP: The 20th century is only considered to be violent because people are idiots with no sense of perspective. It is much less violent than previous centuries and has been steadily getting less so, even if it has been getting more democratic. Which is not the say the latter is the cause of the former. If you click that link you will hear that homicide kills twenty times as many people as war these days and may think that this represents an explosion of homicide (although combining the two still gives fewer deaths than war alone used to), but homicide is also much lower than it was in the good old days.
Mencius errs because he does not collect large amounts of data and make an analysis, but rather focuses on the salient but unrepresentative.
Finally, people have changed. They are a lot less violent than they used to be. Presumably this is mostly cultural, but it may also be partly genetic. Whatever the reason, Americans no longer seem to feel any excitement about the possibility of invading Canada. This can only be regarded as a good thing.
Because socialism is democratic, it distrusts, opposes and tends to destroy organizational structures which are built on (a) hierarchical command, (b) personal responsibility, and/or (c) financial interests.
Your socialist state will never produce a structure in which a single planner is responsible for, say, North Carolina; can fire whomever he likes in the administration of North Carolina; and gets fired himself, if North Carolina does not blossom into a subtropical Eden. This is an organizational structure that one might find in, say, the British Raj. It is not democratic in nature, nor socialist.
It may seem odd that a two-party state would be so much better than a one-party state. But it actually makes a great deal of sense.
Two-party or multiparty states succeed because none of the parties can redirect state revenue openly to its own pocket. They have an incentive to compromise, and they often compromise on something like professional management. The result, although still afflicted by factional tension, may approach something like the rule of law.
Of course, power has consequences. Nanoslices add up. And so when Peter Thiel says that when women got their nanoslice, the competence of this gigantic committee deteriorated (from his perspective, in which good government equals libertarian government—which is also Will’s perspective, and also more or less mine), he is making a factual statement. His point is neither philosophical nor normative.
If one can say that Louis XIV was a more effective ruler than Louis XV, one can say that a gigantic committee of men was a more effective ruler than a gigantic committee of men and women. The point can be argued, of course. But it must be argued with facts, rather than gas.
If you're going to talk about states as organizations with limited monopolies of force and as aggregations of contracts, you should spend a little time with the economists and econ historians who've been working on these ideas for decades.
Power and Prosperity by Mancur Olson
Structure and Change in Economic History by Douglass North
A Theory of the State by Yoram Barzel
Of Rule and Revenue by Margaret Levi
Organization Theory by Oliver Williamson
as well as the most recent work -- not yet in book form -- by North, Wallis and Weingast
"More Right" is not any kind of acknowledged offspring of Less Wrong nor is it so much as linked to by the Less Wrong site. We are not part of a neoreactionary conspiracy. We are and have been explicitly pro-Enlightenment, as such, under that name. Should it be the case that any neoreactionary is citing me as a supporter of their ideas, I was never asked and never gave my consent. Some kind of note in the article to this effect seems appropriate. Thanks.
Also to be clear: I try not to dismiss ideas out of hand due to fear of public unpopularity. However I found Scott Alexander's takedown of neoreaction convincing and thus I shrugged and didn't bother to investigate further. Democracy has many known malfunctions and it may be that some better way for human beings to organize themselves will be discovered. That way, however, shall not be aristocracy, any more than the next theory of gravitation after General Relativity might be Newtonian mechanics. The ratchet of progress turns unpredictably, but it doesn't turn backward.
CLS〔Critical Legal Study〕, like all leftist idealisms, is the product of the universal human drive for power and control. Both of us might like to get rid of this drive, but we can't. It's an engineering reality. It has to be designed around.
While arms limitation is not my favorite mechanism for controlling friction (I prefer the rule of law), it certainly works, and there is much to be said for it. The trick is making sure that there is no incentive to escalate.
Basically, what formalism tells me is that copyright is a bad idea :-)
This is because formalism tries to align legal powers with those who physically possess these powers, and since any teenager in 2007 has the power to pirate like a fiend, trying to stop him will inevitably generate informal politics.
Admittedly, this was hard to anticipate. But then, copyrights were supposed to have a limited term, once...