Making and Breaking Plutocracy

In a recent article written by the founder of BrightID, the uniqueness of IDs (One person, one ID) is ensured, but it is difficult to address Collusion. If friends exchange their interests, they will have double voting power. For example, let's imagine that Calvin and Delilah, who are not interested in Acme DAO and Beta DAO respectively, exchange their membership/governance tokens. Currently, Calvin holds two Beta tokens and Delilah holds two Acme tokens, which goes against the goal of equal distribution of governance among members in the DAO. The root of this problem is that Calvin and Delilah have nothing to lose by being members of both DAOs, so they can easily exchange governance rights with someone who cares about them.

To address this issue, some propose to gamify the voting system, including Legalized collusion (Collusive Smart Contracts (=Bribery) is one example), such as the Curve War. This can be seen as a form of Radical Market, where we may not need to adhere strictly to formal democracy.

According to the Public Choice Theory, one reason why voters are indifferent is that the value of their interest distribution is lower than the cost of investigating voting options. An important feature in the Plutocracy roadmap is indifference.

BrightID's Attention Streams play a role in proportional effects of individual voting and lack of motivation to vote when individual voting is small. It is difficult to encourage participation in governance when the rewards obtained through proposals (if any) go to someone else. It is easier to just ride along with someone else who pays attention to the issue. In contrast, in the economic domain, if there is a possibility of making a profit, people are motivated to bring about change. The goal of Attention Streams is to discover popular and proven ideas early on in the economic domain and make them work in the governance domain. Once it is understood that money can be made through this method, participation increases, funding for public goods increases, and rules for self-improvement in a system with economic effects are improved. Isn't this exactly Can high-quality content be promoted to the top by conducting content curation in a prediction market? (Prediction Market)?

Participants create options, such as creating text to delegate to a specific topic or voting early (this is not well understood). Even if they lose, they can still profit by contributing. I guess I need to delve into this a bit more...

- Collaborative Design of Contribution Tracking Systems for Decentralized Organizations

- Aiming for a Fair Voting System (Japanese Translation)